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ALAMI V. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC.1
(decided February 19, 2002)
1. SYNOPSIS
In writing for the majority, Judge Wesley, of the New York
Court of Appeals, held that regardless of the initial cause of a fatal
accident, public policy would not preclude a claim to recover
wrongful death damages caused by an alleged design defect in a
motor vehicle. 2 In his dissent, Judge Rosenblatt argued that a
plaintiff engaged in a serious violation of the law should not profit




Silhadi Alami (decedent) was driving his Volkswagen Jetta
home when his vehicle left an exit ramp and collided with a steel
utility pole.4 His blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit set
forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2). 5 He died as a result of his
injuries: fractured ribs, a ruptured liver, and massive internal
hemorrhaging. 6
The decedent's widow sued Volkswagen of America, Inc. to re-
cover damages for wrongful death. The plaintiff contended an al-
leged defect in the vehicle's design exacerbated the decedent's
injuries and was the direct cause of his death. 7 Volkswagen moved
for summary judgment asserting that the decedent's intoxication
precluded recovery on public policy grounds. 8 The defendant ar-
gued that the decedent's intoxication was the sole cause of the
1. 97 N.Y.2d 281(2002).
2. Id. at 284.
3. Id. at 289.
4. Id. at 284 (Alami was driving at approximately 35 mph when his car went off of
the exit ramp).
5. Id.; N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAw §1192(2)(McKinney 2001).
6. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 284.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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crash and that no defect or malfunction in the Jetta caused or con-
tributed to itY
In support of her claim, the plaintiff submitted to the court an
affidavit and report from an expert who had inspected the vehicle,
the autopsy report, photographs at the scene of the accident, police
reports and crash test results from Volkswagen and the federal gov-
ernment.10 The expert reported structural deficiencies in the man-
ufacture of the vehicle caused its floorboard to buckle upward
during the collision, thus causing the decedent to be thrown for-
ward and suffer thoracic and abdominal injuries that led to his
death." The expert concluded that if the vehicle had a transverse
stringer' 2 to provide adequate structural support and a three-point
combination lap harness the decedent would have survived the
crash suffering only minimal injury.'
3
The Supreme Court, Westchester County granted Volk-
swagen's motion for summary judgment based upon the holdings
in Barker v. Kallasht 4 and Manning v. Brown. 15 Under Barker and
Manning a plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages if they
are injured as a direct result of a serious violation of the law. 16
Thus, the plaintiff's claim was precluded based on the court's find-
ing that decedent's drunk driving constituted a serious violation of
the law and his injuries were the direct result of that violation.' 7
The plaintiff appealed the order and the Appellate Division
affirmed. 18
The Appellate Division reviewed evidence submitted by the de-
fendant showing that the decedent was highly intoxicated when he
lost control of his vehicle. 19 Utilizing this evidence, the court held
that "the negligent manner in which the decedent was operating
9. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 284.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. A transverse stringer is a specific part for an automobile.
13. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 285 (the safety features mentioned were readily available
in the automobile industry).
14. 63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984).
15. 91 N.Y.2d 116 (1997).
16. 63 N.Y.2d at 39.; 91 N.Y.2d at 122.
17. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 285.




his vehicle was the sole proximate cause of the collision and his
fatal injuries." 20 The Court of Appeals granted a motion for leave
to appeal to resolve the issue of whether a claim alleging a defective
vehicle design is precluded on public policy grounds where intoxi-
cation was the cause of the fatal automobile accident.
21
III. DIscussIoN
The Barker/Manning rule is premised on public policy.22 It is
premised on the notion that one may not profit from one's own
wrong2 3 in tort actions seeking compensation for injuries resulting
from their own criminal activities of a serious nature.24 In Barker,
the court precluded the plaintiffs claim against those who had fa-
cilitated his construction of a pipe bomb because "to permit an ac-
tion for injuries sustained as a consequence of the plaintiffs own
grievous criminal conduct-the construction of a 'pipe bomb'-
would contravene fundamental public policy of this State. '25 In
Manning, the court precluded a 'joyrider" from bringing a claim
against her fellow wrongdoer for injuries received during their un-
lawful ride.26 According to the court, the plaintiff unjustifiably en-
gaged in an activity, which was hazardous to the public at large-
clearly a serious violation of the law-and her injuries were the di-
rect result of her knowing participation in the activity.27
Citing Barker and Manning, Volkswagen and Amici28 argued for
preclusion of the plaintiffs claim on public policy grounds.29
"Where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will
not entertain suit if the plaintiffs conduct constitutes a serious vio-
20. Alami, 718 N.Y.S.2d 604
21. Alami v. Volkswagen, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 714 (2001); see also, Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at
285.
22. See Reno v. D'Javid, 42 N.Y.2d 1040 (1977) (The Alami court noted that this
policy was first applied when they denied the claim against a doctor for negligence in
performing an illegal abortion).
23. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
24. Manning, 667 N.Y.2d at 338.
25. Barker, 63 N.Y.2d at 29.
26. Manning, 667 N.Y. at 339.
27. See id. at 339.
28. 2001 NY Lexis 3387 (N.Y. 2001) (granting motion for Amicus Brief of Product
Liability Advisory Council); 2001 NY Lexis 3389 (N.Y. 2001) (granting motion for Ami-
cus Brief of Mothers Against Drunk Driving).
29. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 285.
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lation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recov-
ery are the direct result of that violation." 30 Here the decedent was
driving while intoxicated and lost control of his vehicle as a result of
that intoxication.
Rebutting the defendant's contention, the plaintiff argued that
since her action was based upon defects in the vehicle's design and
their role in her husband's death, Barker and Manning did not bar
her claim.3 1 Plaintiff did not contest Volkswagen's assertion that
decedent's intoxication was the cause of the vehicles collision with
the utility pole. 32 The plaintiff maintained that her husband's intox-
ication was not the direct cause of the injuries for which she wished
to recover.
3 3
In analyzing whether the plaintiffs claim would be precluded
on public policy grounds the Court of Appeals did not emphasize
the issue of whether the decedent was engaged in a serious viola-
tion of the law. "Operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated
condition is indisputably a serious violation of the law."'3 4 Rather,
the court emphasized that the plaintiffs claim was premised on the
design defect and not the decedent's intoxication as the cause of
the injuries for which she sought recovery.
35
According to the court, Barker/Manning extends the basic
principle that one may not profit from one's own wrong.3 6 In es-
sence, the Barker/Manning rule established that a plaintiff could
not rely upon an illegal act or relationship to define the defen-
dant's duty.3 7 In this case, the court refused to extend application
of the Barker/Manning beyond claims where the parties to the suit
were involved in the underlying criminal conduct, or where the
criminal plaintiff seeks to impose a duty arising out of an illegal
act.
38
The court distinguished the plaintiffs claim from Barker and
Manning. Although operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated
30. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 285.
31. Id. at 286.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 285.
35. Id.
36. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 286.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 278.
[Vol. 47
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was clearly a serious violation of the law, if Volkswagen defectively
designed the Jetta, as asserted by the plaintiff's expert, it breached a
duty to any driver of a Jetta involved in a crash regardless of the
initial cause.39 The plaintiff did not seek to profit from her hus-
band's intoxication, she only asked for Volkswagen to honor its
duty to produce a product that does not unreasonably enhance or
aggravate a user's injuries.40 The court concluded that the duty the
plaintiff sought to impose on Volkswagen originated not from her
husband's act, but from Volkswagen's obligation to design, manu-
facture, and market a safe vehicle. 41 The court reasoned that if
they were to extend Barker/Manning here they would "abrogate leg-
islatively-mandated comparative fault analysis in a wide range of tort
claims" and essentially relieve Volkswagen of its duty to manufac-
ture safe automobiles. 42
The dissent vehemently disagreed with the majority's holding
and contended Barker/Manning precluded the plaintiff's claim. 43
The preclusion doctrine prevents a plaintiff from profiting from his
or her own criminal acts. 44 The Barker/Manning rule precludes a
claim at the threshold of the plaintiffs application for relief, before
the court can determine the defendant's culpability. 45 In Barker
and Manning it was clear that the defendant's contributed to the
plaintiff's injuries. 46 However, the court barred the suits rather
than apply comparative negligence principles because the policy ra-
tionale of preclusion always existed independently from the rule of
contributory negligence.47
The dissent contended that the majority allows for injured
plaintiffs, as a result of their own serious violations of the law, to
more easily avoid dismissal by demonstrating that the defendant
owed a duty that did not "arise out of' the illegality.48 The major-
ity's rationale invites people injured as a result of their own unlaw-
39. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 287. (emphasis added)
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 288.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 286.
45. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 286.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 290.
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ful acts to "blame others" and recover damages previously
precluded under Barker and Manning.49 The majority failed to pro-
vide a guideline for when a duty "arises out of' illegal conduct
thereby creating the likelihood of inconsistency in the lower
courts50 .
Although the dissent makes a valid point that the majority has
potentially "opened the floodgate" to claims by plaintiffs who have
been injured while engaged in serious illegal acts, this decision
demonstrates that manufacturers will not be relieved of their duty
of safety merely because a consumer is engaged in an illegal activity
at the time of injury. An automobile is an inherently dangerous
instrument that could lead to death upon collision. The manufac-
turer is obligated to manufacture and distribute a safe product. A
design defect that compromises the safety of the vehicle is a breach
of duty to all consumers, not only the sober ones. It is clear from the
majority's opinion that they did not intend to allow plaintiffs to
benefit from their illegal behavior. Rather, the court demonstrated
their disapproval of a manufacturer attempting to deny responsibil-
ity for decedent's fatal injuries because he was intoxicated at the
time of his accident.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court ultimately held that where an automobile manufac-
turer's defective design leads to fatal injuries, the manufacturer's
duty of care to the driver is breached regardless of the cause of the
crash.
Cynara Hermes
49. Alami, 97 N.Y.2d at 291.
50. Id.
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